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The study of revolution is a very popular and intriguing realm of social 
science.  Iran has been undergoing a persistent state of upheaval since the fall of 
the Shah in 1979.  Previous study on revolutions by scholars like Theodore Gurr, 
Theda Skocpol, and Jack Goldstone, suggest that within the context of a 
revolution, the final results are never readily apparent because people rebel 
against the status quo and destroy associated institutions whether or not they 
had a positive influence. The passage of time, leads to a pendulum shift from one 
extreme towards moderation.  Iran went from a pro-western secular stance to an 
anti-western theocracy; therefore the question arises whether Iran is ripe for a 
new revolution that may bring about a healthier equilibrium?  Using the 
framework set by Theodore Gurr in his book Why Men Rebel, this work is 
attempts to analyze how Relative Deprivation has affected Iran.  This method of 
measuring discontent will be used to see how the opposition stands up to the 
status quo in order to determine how the latter will end thus restoring the 
equilibrium, which has been proven throughout history and is elaborated upon by 
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Chapter I is about the hypothesis that the theocracy in Iran will succumb to 
internal pressures brought about by Theodore Gurr’s theory of Relative 
Deprivation.  Also discussed is why Gurr’s framework was chosen and how it will 
be applied.  
Chapter II examines current conventional wisdom and will identify some of 
the institutions, personalities, and policies towards which, the dissatisfaction of 
the populace is focused.  
Chapter III describes the theory of Relative Deprivation in Iran.  Relative 
Deprivation is the discrepancy between reality and expectations within a given 
society.  This discrepancy brings about discontent, the level of which determines 
what course of action the general populace will take against the institutions, 
personalities, and policies deemed responsible.  
Chapter IV examines the coercive balance in Iran.  The incumbents 
(mullahs) will defend the status quo while the threatened (dissidents) retaliate 
against measures employed by the former.  Incumbents and dissidents should 
have three characteristics: ideology, institutions, and leadership.  The relative 
strengths of these three characteristics determine the potential for counterforce.   
The combination of relative deprivation and the coercive balance results in the 
magnitude of violence, which is classified as conspiracy, turmoil, or internal war.   
The conclusion will draw from the analysis of relative deprivation, coercive 
balance, and political violence potential to determine if Iran is indeed ripe for a 
revolution, and if so, in what form may the present government loose power. by 
collapse or overthrow.   
 xiii
I. INTRODUCTION: IS IRAN RIPE FOR A NEW REVOLUTION? 
THE HYPOTHESIS AND WHY IT WAS CHOSEN 
 
In recent times, the world has witnessed the manifestation of popular 
unrest focused against the ruling clerics in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the only 
longstanding theocracy in the world.  As a result, keen Middle East observers 
wonder if the mullahs will eventually loose their grip on power.  The major 
popular outcries in recent memory are the massive student riots in 1999, the 
hesitance of the ruling clerics to hand down a potential death sentence on 
Professor Hashemi Aghajari who asserted in late 2002 that Islam needed to 
undergo a reformation in the same manner as Christianity; and finally, the week 
of riots in June 2003 in Teheran, Shiraz, and Tabriz, which were some of the 
largest since the fall of the Shah.  The latest set of riots was in part motivated by 
the presence of satellite television stations broadcasting from the United States.  
The June 2003 protesters also received moral support from President George 
Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair among many others.  Given the current 
global political climate which is dominated by the ongoing “Global War on 
Terrorism” and the U.S. led overthrow of Saddam Hussein and subsequent 
occupation of Iraq; Iran’s presence on the “axis of evil” those interested in Middle 
Eastern events are beginning to wonder if the mullahs will be the next to fall, and 
if so, when and how would this happen.  The objective of this work is to show 
how the interaction between certain conditions in Iran will lead to the end of the 
Iranian theocracy. 
A critical analysis of events in Iran against the works of one of the 
foremost scholars on political violence and revolutions, Theodore Gurr, leads to a 
conclusion that the current situation in Iran is untenable for the mullahs.  The first 
pressure point on the mullahs is the dismal economic outlook for most of the 
population, which also happens to have been born after the 1979 revolution.  A 
second pressure point is the external pressure on Iran due to the “Global War on 
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Terrorism.”  Iran, which is acknowledged to be the largest state sponsor of 
terrorism, has to contend with large U.S. military presence in Iraq, the Persian 
Gulf, Afghanistan, and Central Asia.  The outcome of events in Iraq will have 
great bearing on the Iranian theocracy’s ability to control events at home. The 
third pressure point is the stifling of social freedom and the mitigation of political 
expression in a country with a relatively advanced civilization dating back more 
than two millennia with the Persian Empire.  This is in sharp contrast to Iran’s 
Arab neighbors, which lived a mostly tribal existence that did not take off until the 
ascendance of Islam in 622A.D.  
Theodore Gurr published Why Men Rebel in 1970.  He seeks to explain 
the causes and possible outcomes of political violence.  Gurr parts from the 
premise that institutions, persons, and policies of rulers have been the focal point 
of popular ire when they are not content with their collective lot.  The political, 
social, and economic climate brought about by the institutions, personalities, and 
policies of rulers lead to relative deprivation which is the people’s perceived 
difference between two values: what the people have and what they are capable 
of attaining.  If the discrepancy between the aforementioned values reaches a 
given magnitude, political violence is likely because the people will find solace in 
venting their anger since other means of recourse are apparently closed to them.  
Gurr then goes on to match the capability of the dissidents to rock the 
foundations of the establishment against the latter’s ability to stay put; this is 
called the coercive balance.   Note above that the dissident capability to shake 
the foundations of the establishment is mentioned.  This is because when 
studying social uprisings, the fall of the established powers is never guaranteed 
unless it is being studied post facto.  
The last element in Gurr’s analysis is the end state.  Will the regime 
collapse, be overthrown, or remain in power.  The end state is directly linked to 
the coercive balance.  After prolonged analysis following Gurr’s framework, it will 
be shown through the course of this work that the third outcome is unlikely to 
hold true in Iran’s case. 
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Theodore Gurr’s framework for the study of political upheaval was 
selected in this case because it is the one, which best-fit Iran.  In the arena of 
social revolutions and political unrest, there are several notable scholars such as 
Theda Skocpol (States and Social Revolutions) and Jack Goldstone 
(Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies) to name but a 
few.  Skocpol concentrates on the most important revolutions in modern history: 
French, Russian, and Chinese.  Goldstone does a study on some of the same as 
Skocpol with the addition of the fall of communism, the Philippines (1986), 
Palestinian Intifada, Iran, and the guerilla wars in Latin America. These works 
however focus on the historical aspect rather than ongoing cause and effect 
issues.  Theda Skocpol has a very authoritative account of social revolutions in 
her book, with the premise that the Chinese, Russian, and French revolutions 
were the most important in influencing today’s world.  That is true, however, if 
there is a revolution that has greatly shaped the way the contemporary world 
functions, it was the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the net result, the Iranian 
mullah led theocracy. The world is dealing with the aftereffects of the 1979 
revolution.  It is difficult to conceive of how the Soviet Union could have invaded 
Afghanistan in late 1979 had the staunch American ally, the Shah, still been in 
power.  It is almost certain that Saddam Hussein would not have invaded Iran 
hoping to capitalize on the upheaval caused by the revolution in 1980.  This 
being the case, the latter would not have had the need to invade Kuwait in an 
attempt to settle war debts against Iran.  Hence Usama bin Laden would be 
neutralized on two fronts and would not be an issue.  This is a big case of “what 
if” and therefore not the purpose of this work.  It serves to show how destabilizing 
the rule of the mullahs has been to Iran and the Persian Gulf region.  This 
instability has not served to better the fortunes of Iranians who hoped that the 
end of the Shah’s monarch would be the beginning of better days.  In fact this is 
the theme of Dariush Zahedi’s book The Iranian Revolution Then and Now.  
Gurr’s framework, which is centered on relative deprivation, is capable of helping 
Middle East observers in understanding how the destabilizing influence of the 
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mullahs has cheated Iranians of a life in accordance with their capabilities 















II. AT WHAT INSTITUTIONS, PERSONALITIES, AND 
POLICIES ARE THE DISCONTENTS OF IRANIANS  FOCUSED? 
 
Keen observers of the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot help but notice 
increasing signs of civil unrest in the country, particularly amongst the youth.  
The events of the past few months surrounding the arrest, trial, and death 
sentence of university professor, Hashemi Aghajari, who called for reforms in the 
theocratic government have helped fuel the concern about the increasing popular 
dissatisfaction.   Adding to the mix, intense student rioting occurred in Iran in 
June 2003.  These were the largest riots since the departure of the Shah in 1979.  
The June 2003 riots attracted the attention of foreigners to the need for 
democracy in Iran.  The country has been in a state of upheaval since a 
Revolution forced the Shah from office in 1979.  The country has since been in 
search of a direction that would lead it to a prosperous future with social justice 
and popular sovereignty has seen itself fall well short of that goal.  As a result, 
Iranian society has been focusing its discontent towards the institutions, 
personalities and policies which have set the country on its present course, 
namely the valy-e faqih (Supreme Leader), Council of Guardians, bonyads 
(Islamic charitable foundations), and the basiji (an organized band of government 
sponsored thugs).  The personalities are the current valy-e faqih, Ayatollah Ali 
Khamanei and President Mohammed Khatami.  The policies in this case are the 
suffocating control of social freedom, and continued animosity towards the United 
States.  This chapter will examine these institutions, personalities, and policies, 
and determine why they have become the focal point of so much frustration. 
The current situation in Iran is very confusing even for those who 
understand the country.  The population’s frustrations are focused on the ruling 
Islamic clerics. The perception among many is that the mullahs are ruling Iran 
because it is a very religious state.  This observation is inaccurate.  Religion is a 
very important part of Iranian society; however, it is not the dominant aspect of 
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the latter but rather the facet of contemporary life, which happens to be the 
power behind the government.  The Shi’a clergy has a very tight grip on the reins 
of power in Iran.  To understand why there is so much popular unrest against the 
Islamic government, it is necessary to understand how it came to power in the 
first place because through the course of Iran’s 2,500-year history, the period 
from 1979 onward has been the first time the Shi’a clergy ever ruled the nation.  
The man most associated with the Shi’a clergy is the Late Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini, a learned cleric who became the face of the Iranian 
Revolution.  However, his rise to power along with that of the institution he 
represented is an accident of history. 
The Islamic government’s predecessor was that of the Late Shah 
Mohammed Reza Pahlevi.  He was a secular Western-oriented monarch who 
after 1953 ruled his country as a one-man dictatorship.  He strove to drive Iran 
from backwardness to a world power.  In similar fashion to his father, Reza, the 
Shah believed that for Iran to advance towards the ranks of industrialized and 
prosperous nations, the people would have to give up their traditional ways of life 
for they stood in the way of sustained progress.  As a result, he curtailed political 
freedom and ruled as an absolute monarch.  The Shah saw the ever-increasing 
oil revenues as the means with which he would provide for industrialization, and 
education of the country.  Two key factors began to take their toll on the Shah, 
the first being his reinstatement by the United States and Britain after he was fled 
the country in 1953, and the increasing demand for oil which provided the Shah 
with the financial wherewithal to pursue his goal of economic advancement.  The 
increased revenues made Iran in many respects a surrogate of the United 
States, which as the leader of the industrialized world, was a major customer of 
Iran’s oil and an enabler of the Shah’s internal policies.  With increased 
education, Iranians began to seek political freedom and questioned the 
legitimacy of their country’s government.  Regime legitimacy is an issue that 
haunts most Iranian rulers; this happens to be the case for today’s clerics and will 
be covered in the next chapter. The desire for political freedom reached a boiling 
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point in 1978 when massive protests against the Shah’s rule began partly as a 
result of a fundamental change in U.S. government policy which under the newly 
elected president Carter promoted human rights and democratization.  As a 
result of such pressure from his principal international ally, the Shah had to give 
in to the demands of his people, however, he was granting concessions from a 
position of weakness.  Therefore, in the period of 1978-79, the growing 
consensus was that the Shah had to go and Iran needed political and social 
freedom, as well as a greater degree of economic independence from the West, 
America in particular.  This is a parallel to today’s situation in which the 
consensus is that the clerics must go but who exactly will replace them is another 
question.  The failure to confront this question in 1979 landed Iran where it is 
today.1 
Even though there was a consensus on the desired end result, there was 
no unity amongst the dissidents who ranged from liberals and socialists, to 
conservatives and radical religious factions.  Therefore, when the Shah could no 
longer control the country, partly due to his personal indecisiveness, the country 
was thrown into chaos.  By late 1979, the Shi’a clergy led by Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini solidified its grip on power and has retained it ever since.2 
The clerics grip on power was solid but in a classic validation of Stephen 
Walt’s study of revolutions and warfare, the Iraqi invasion in September 1980 
helped Khomeini because the Iranian people rallied around him in order to 
defend against enemy aggression.  With widespread popular support, Khomeini 
was able to justify the use of heavy-handed measures against his rivals further 
facilitating his consolidation of power backed by popular fervor.3 
The Shi’a clergy or mullahs were unique amongst the ranks of dissidents 
because they were the only group that had the three main ingredients for the 
                                                 
1 Jack Goldstone, Ted Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri: Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century. p. 
126-7. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.  
2 Goldstone, Gurr, and Moshiri, 118. 
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3 Stephen Walt. “Revolution and War”, World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992), reprinted in J. 
Goldstone, ed., Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies. p. 328. Little 
Brown, 1993.  
success of any movement advocating social and political change; they had an 
ideology: Islam, leadership: the charismatic Khomeini, and an infrastructure: the 
Shi’a religious establishment with mosques, money, and religious schools.  The 
other factions that sought the Shah’s removal such as the Communist inspired 
Tudeh party were driven underground by the repressive secret police apparatus.  
The leaders of the émigré literati (secular elite) had been in exile and were losing 
touch with the country.  The mullahs were able to mobilize support through their 
mosques because they vehemently opposed the Shah because of his secular 
incursions on their religious domain, and the émigré literati allied with them in 
order to see the end of the Pahlevi dynasty.  It was expected that once the 
Revolution was over, the mullahs would return to their mosques leaving 
governance up to the secular elites.  The mullahs led by Khomeini did not follow 
this line of wishful thinking and instead consolidated power.4 
In summing up the historical background to the ascendance of the 
mullahs, it is also important to mention the significance of the clerical 
infrastructure because as described earlier, it is in the case of Iran, the leg of the 
triad that sustains the leadership and ideology.  In Iran, as with any Muslim state, 
the clerical institutions wield a great deal of power through traditional means 
radiating from the mosques and religious schools.  One of the five pillars of Islam 
is zakat (charity). Every Muslim is supposed to set aside a portion of their income 
for a charity of their choice.  A lot of the money goes to charity institutions known 
as bonyads, which operate with the sanction of the mosques.  The bonyads will 
be examined in greater detail later, but for now, it is mentioned as a means of 
providing some baseline understanding of how power is institutionalized. The 
bonyads finance everything from schools, hospitals, mosques, and many other 
social projects.  Therefore, the mullahs can deliver their message through their 
religious schools, which are financed by the bonyads that in turn are supported 
by the common people, among who the bazaaris (merchants) are prominently 
featured.  Thanks to the fourth pillar of Islam, zakat, the tentacles of the mullahs 
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4 Dariush Zahedi: The Iranian Revolution Then and Now, indicators of regime instability. p. 42-3. 
Boulder, Westview Press, 2001. 
run deep into Iranian society.  This is coupled with the fact that the identity of Iran 
derives from Shi’a Islam, the second most significant sect within the religion.  
Although only ten percent of the world’s Muslims are Shi’a, they constitute ninety 
percent of Iran’s population.  Shi’a or not, Iran is basically a Muslim country, and 
as such, adherence to the five pillars is part of the Persian way of life making a 
lack of contribution to the bonyad an un-Islamic act. 
Another factor that makes Iran an interesting country is that it is the only 
one in the Middle East with defined borders.  Unlike the borders of Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, or Jordan, which were determined by former colonial masters, those of 
Iran almost resemble the borders of a European state because they are defined 
by geographical features and within them, a multi-ethnic state consisting of 
Persians, Arabs, and Turks, inhabitants who have lived together in relative 
peace.  The multi ethnicity of Iran has been a source of strength as well as 
weakness. It is a strong point because the occurrence of ethnic violence is 
reduced.  The weakness, as evidenced in the 1979 revolution is that it inhibits 
consensus therefore the mullahs with some difficulty were the only ones who 
were able to transcend those divisions successfully. 
A. INSTITUTIONS 
 
Given the aforesaid background on the 1979 revolution and Iran in 
general, it is time to take a look at the Islamic government of Iran.  A Supreme 
Leader, the valy-e faqih, heads the government.  The valy-e faqih is a concept 
and an institution created by the late Ayatollah Khomeini.  It is best described in 
the following extract from Dariush Zahedi: 
This concept which constitutes the cornerstone of the regime’s 
Constitution, justifies the role of jurisconsult (faqih) as the “supreme 
overseer, judge, and guardian” of the Islamic community.  In his 
formulation of this concept, Khomeini specifically states that the 
religious jurist has a sacred obligation to become the final arbiter of 
the state.5 
The valy-e faqih, once chosen by the leading mullahs who constitute the 
Council of Experts, the eighty-six most senior Ayatollahs, serves for the rest of 
                                                 
5 Zahedi, 68-9. 
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his life.  Khomeini, as the perceived leader of the revolution was the first valy-e 
faqih.  Upon Khomeini’s death in June 1989, Ali Khamanei succeeded him.  The 
valy-e faqih is the most powerful person in Iran.  When the identification of 
institutions and personalities was made earlier in this work, the valy-e faqih and 
Ali Khamanei were mentioned.  However, the Supreme Leadership should be 
seen as an institution. The valy-e faqih institution draws as much ire as the 
person who occupies the post, Ali Khamanei.  The valy-e faqih position was 
created by Khomeini to be commensurate with his charismatic personality; hence 
his successor has a great act to follow.  This will become clear later in the 
chapter. 
The valy-e faqih is the representative of the “Twelfth Imam” on earth.  The 
Supreme Leader therefore rules in his name and sovereignty is derived from God 
because: 
The Almighty in his infinite wisdom had anointed the Prophet 
Muhammad as his messenger and through him, set down the rules 
in the Qu’ran in order to guide the community.  The Prophet in turn, 
had founded an ideal state dedicated to the propagation of Islamic 
precepts.6 
The previous extract gives an interesting perspective as to where the valy-
e faqih derives his legitimacy.  The Shi’a believe that Ali, son of Muhammad 
should have ascended to the leadership of the Caliph, but was turned down in 
favor of Abu-Bakr who was elected from amongst the followers of the ummah 
(Muslim community).  Ali led a breakaway faction of the ummah and was killed in 
661.  Eleven imams succeeded him.  The twelfth, Muhammad al-Muntazar 
“disappeared” in 878 and is believed will return to earth to deliver peace and 
justice.  Therefore, because the sovereignty is derived from the Almighty, the 
people are, according to Khomeini, not in a position to choose their ultimate 
authority.7  
The next institution in the line of fire is the Council of Guardians.  They are 
a body of twelve religious jurists, six of whom are appointed by the valy-e faqih 
                                                 
6 Zahedi. 69. 
 10
7 Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr. A Concise History of the Middle East. Boulder. p.79. Westview Press, 
1996.  
and the remainder elected by the majlis (parliament).  The Council of Guardians 
should not be confused with the Council of Experts.  The Guardians serve as the 
second highest appellate authority in Iran, the highest being the valy-e faqih.  
Their function is more appropriately described below: 
The Council of Guardians is vested with the authority to interpret 
the constitution and determines if the laws passed by Parliament 
are in line with shari’a. This means that the council has effective 
veto power over Parliament. If it deems that a law passed by 
Parliament is incompatible with the constitution or shari’a, it is 
referred back to Parliament for revision.8 
One of the most important duties of the Council of Guardians is the vetting 
of candidates for public office.   There are two important criteria for selection as a 
political candidate, the first being “practical adherence to Islam”, and the second, 
“acceptance of the concept of valy-e faqih and commitment to the political 
system.” As their name suggests, the council has been the staunchest protector 
of the revolution.  In the 1997 Presidential election, only four candidates were 
allowed to run for election out of the 230 that applied.  The reasoning for this 
according to the council secretary, Ayatollah Janati was that “enemies of the 
revolution had to be weeded out.” The vetting process occurs for all elections 
from the presidency to local government.9   
The third institution is one that has been mentioned earlier, the bonyad, or 
charitable religious foundations.  The bonyads have been the interface between 
the Iranian people who being predominantly Muslim practice the fourth pillar, 
zakat.  Some bonyads were set up by the Shah to engage in charity work and at 
the same time spread good words about the accomplishments of his regime.  
The Shah’s bonyads were taken over by the revolutionaries shortly after his 
ouster.  They were attractive targets because they controlled vast sums of money 
and land.  Thanks to their inheritance of some of the Shah’s fortunes as well as 
engagement in shrewd business practices, bonyads such as the Foundation for 
the Oppressed, Martyrs Foundation, and War Wounded own collectively over 
                                                 
8 Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) Frontline: Terror and Teheran, The structure of power in 
Iran. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html  (7 December 2002) 
9 Zahedi, 105. 
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100 billion dollars in assets.  They control over 40 percent of the non-oil sector of 
the Iranian economy.  Because of this share, they exert a lot of influence in the 
government but are not accountable to the same.  The bonyads receive 
government subsidies but the latter is limited in the amount of scrutiny it lays.  
The government’s frustration in dealing with the venerable bonyads is even 
codified in the law; the majlis can initiate an investigation into a bonyad but it 
cannot take action against any wrongdoings. There is a very low rate of private 
capital accumulation in Iran and the foundations are one of the few means the 
government has at its disposal for internal economic investment.10   
The bonyads have become a major economic impediment in the country.  
Iran is a nation that has experienced significant contraction in its economy.  In 
1977, the gross national product (GNP) was about 85 billion dollars.11  By 1986, 
the GNP had shrunk to about 82 billion dollars.12  In 2001, the Iranian GDP was 
valued at 115 Billion dollars.13  If the 1986 figures were transposed to 2001, the 
GDP would have to be valued at 135 billion dollars; in other words, the Iranian 
economy has not kept up with the dollar and has lost one seventh of its value.  
The bonyads with their enormous hold on the non-petroleum sector of the 
economy have been able to stifle entrepreneurs.  As a result, the bazaaris who 
are not in direct contact with the bonyads suffer because the latter have been 
able to dominate the export and import businesses.  Thanks to their status as 
Islamic charities, the bonyads are exempt from taxation.  This makes the 
government reliant almost solely on the revenues from the oil industry, which due 
to the sanctions imposed by the United States has never been able to attain the 
output it once did under the Shah.  This is a theme almost reminiscent from the 
years prior to the French Revolution, when the nobility and clergy comprising the 
                                                 
10 Suzanne Maloney: A report on “Bonyads: Power in Iran.”  Middle East Institute Policy Briefs. 
http://www.mideasti.org/html/maloneyb.html (7 December 2002)  
11 These figures are in actual dollars and not in “purchasing power parity” (PPP) that is used by 
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12 Goldstone, Gurr, and Moshiri, 132.  
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AB54?OpenDocument (8 December 2002) 
First and Third Estates controlled the lion share of the French economy but paid 
no taxes.  The result of this illiberal economic methodology has been a decrease 
in earnings for the Iranian population.14  
The fourth institution is one that is disliked and feared in contemporary 
Iran, it is the basiji.  They can be best described as a group of religious inspired 
thugs who act on behalf of the clerics who along with the bonyads are their key 
sponsors. They originated during the Iran-Iraq War (1979-88) as underage 
volunteers who would march ahead of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) during their assaults on Iraqi strongholds acting as human 
minesweepers.  Members of today’s basiji are those who are normally ineligible 
for military service such as the underage or middle-aged males.  The basiji is not 
centrally controlled from Teheran, but rather, command is outsourced to the local 
mosques, which are in turn accountable to the valy-e faqih.  
 Khomeini originally relied upon the IRGC as stalwarts of the regime.  The 
IRGC was used as the mainline military force during the war against Iraq 
because the regular Iranian military had been purged of its senior leadership and 
in turn was not trusted to be on the front because its loyalty was suspect.  After 
the war, the IRGC retained its preeminence until 1994 when it began falling out 
of favor with the Islamic government.15   
In August 1994, there was a large riot in a town called Ghazvin.  The 
IRGC was sent to quell the riot, but in turn acted in a similar manner as the 
Shah’s security apparatus twelve years earlier when they refused to take up 
arms against their fellow citizens.  The riot continued with greater intensity for 
four more days until the basiji were called up and the riot was ended in very 
brutal fashion.  The basiji were deployed again for riot control in Teheran in 1999 
                                                 
14 Zahedi, 98-9. 
15 Zahedi, 118. 
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after the IRGC was once again reluctant to face the crowds.  From then on, the 
basiji have become the “storm troopers” of the regime.16   
The basiji receive generous allowances from the government and a major 
point of contention with young people is that 40 percent of the vacancies at 
universities are reserved for them and to a lesser extent, war veterans, and the 
families of martyrs.  This is a large portion of vacancies allotted for people who 
generally possess suspect academic qualifications to gain entry into institutions 
of higher learning. They are a vital constituency for the present regime, which 
goes out of its way to keep it loyal.  During the recent student led riots against the 
death sentence imposed on Professor Hashemi Aghajari, Ayatollah Khamanei 
urged the students to desist because if the did not, he would be forced to call 
upon “some very dedicated Muslims.” There was no question as to whom these 
Muslims were; the feared basiji.17  The basiji were also used to great effect in 
suppressing the June 2003 student uprising.18  
B. PERSONALITIES 
 
Perhaps, the biggest target of popular discontent is Ayatollah Ali 
Khamanei, the current valy-e faqih. The ascendance of Khamanei to supreme 
leadership was also an accident of history.  This is accident is relevant in that it 
exposes a very important weakness in the Iranian system of government, 
because the institution of valy-e faqih, having been designed by Ayatollah 
Khomeini, is personality dependent.19  
Khomeini was charismatic and possessed the appropriate religious 
credentials around which the supreme leadership was created.  However, when 
he died, he understood that there was no one who could fill his shoes.  He faced 
a dilemma in that the valy-e faqih needed to be politically astute and at the same 
time be of high clerical standing.  All of the grand ayatollahs that were in line to 
                                                 
16 Zahedi, 118. 
17 Zahedi, 119. 
18 BBC News. Hope on the streets of Teheran 
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succeed Khomeini fit the latter category.  As a result, Khomeini had to find 
Khamanei, who was a cleric but not an ayatollah to succeed him because he was 
politically savvy.  Khomeini in a last act before his death modified the Iranian 
constitution to provide for this.20 
Khamanei has realized from the beginning that his credentials were 
questionable and the theocracy’s legitimacy undermined as a result.  Therefore, 
he has resorted to very high handed measures against those who question him.  
This has caused a rift within the religious establishment who seeing Khamanei’s 
inadequate stature are reluctant to side with an individual who is bearing a 
considerable share of popular resentment.21  The following extract is a glimpse of 
the conventional wisdom surrounding the current supreme leader: 
…Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamanei is bereft of all his predecessor’s 
qualifications.  Khamanei’s scholarly accomplishments are too 
minute to qualify him as an ayatollah let alone a grand ayatollah.   
Khamanei was promoted to the rank of ayatollah, in blatant 
disregard of the long instituted Shi’a tradition of pedagogic 
standards.22  
The increasing unrest has brought about a segment of clerics and 
government officials who desire reform.  As a result, Khamanei has had to put 
himself above the Iranian constitution in order to retain his power.  Although 
Khomeini also ruled above the law, in Iran, the conventional wisdom permitted 
him the luxury because he was decisive in ending the monarchy and had the 
charisma and religious credentials.  Loss of that appeal on the part Khamanei 
has led to an appeal for “the rule of law” and this is where President Mohammed 
Khatami comes into play.23 
Mohammed Khatami is currently the most well known member of the 
Iranian political establishment.  He is known for his desire for reform within the 
clerical government and is a big advocate for the “rule of law.”  
                                                 
20 Zahedi, 80. 
21 Zahedi, 83. 
22 Zahedi, 80. 
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23 Rahe Kargar. Sinking in the Jaws of a General Crisis, Political report of the 5th Congress of the 
Organization of Revolutionary Workers of Iran. http://www.iran-
bulletin.org/report_5th_congress.html (10 December 2002)  
The Iranian presidency is once again unique.  Iran could be considered 
one of the only countries with a branch of government that is superior to the 
executive, i.e., the Islamic clergy.  President Khatami is in charge of the day-to-
day running of the country and he has a 22-member cabinet, which he appoints 
and is confirmed by the majlis (parliament).  The people vote directly for the 
president, vice-president, and the 290 members of the majlis.  Iranians in general 
are pleased that they have control of at least this one portion of government.  
President Khatami, however, is not the commander in chief of the Iranian armed 
forces, nor does he control the judiciary.  These positions are reserved for the 
valy-e faqih. 24 
Khatami is also a cleric, albeit one who recognizes the impracticality of the 
valy-e faqih institution.  He was vetted as one of four candidates for the 1997 
presidential election.  Khatami previously served as culture minister during the 
presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani.  He was well known for his progressive bent 
and religious credentials, and advocated reforms in the system.  This act earned 
him the displeasure of the mullahs who pressured him into resignation.  The 
Council of Guardians then vetted Khatami because they had too much faith in the 
strength of their popularity. The Council of Guardians felt it appropriate to give 
the reformists a token candidacy, which in the mullahs’ minds was destined to 
loose.  Unfortunately, for the mullahs, the favored candidate, Ali-Akbar Nateq-
Nouri, lost the election to Khatami in a landslide.  Khatami won about 70 percent 
of the vote in which nearly 80 percent of all eligible voters participated.  The 
election was viewed as a protest vote against the status quo.25 
President Khatami seeks to gradually reform the Iranian government in 
order to give the people popular sovereignty. His actions are almost a reminder 
of Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to reform communism by giving it a more “human 
face.” In doing so, Khatami seeks to use the Iranian legal system despite all of its 
clerical checks and no balance. He has proceeded with caution in order to save 
himself the wrath of the mullahs.  Even Khatami’s caution was too much for the 
                                                 
24 PBS Frontline: Terror and Teheran 
25 Zahedi, 81-82. 
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mullahs to digest because he began to ask them to open the system and 
institutionalize the “rule of law” in order to prevent arbitrary rule as such is the 
practice today.  He believed that more openness would expand opportunities for 
personal improvement and greater political activity.  He published Khatami’s 12-
Point Platform on Individual Rights and The Economy needs Urgent Care in 
1997. 26  These publications along with his January 1998 interview on CNN with 
Christiane Amanpour in which he showered the United States with praise earned 
him the attention of former president Bill Clinton.27  
Not to be outdone, the mullahs capitalized on Khatami’s Western 
exposure.  They interpreted the large turnout in the 1997 election combined with 
his promotion of the “rule of law” as popular validation of the Iranian system of 
government.  This began to gradually cast doubts on Khatami, because he has 
never made clear what he meant by the “rule of law.”  Did he mean the laws of 
the status quo or laws by which governance was accountable to the people?28 
Khatami was reelected in 2001 by another landslide.  The Iranian 
president is allowed two terms.  An attempt by former president Rafsanjani to 
amend the law to allow for a third term proved unsuccessful in 1996.  During his 
second term, Khatami has made some effort to address the previous question.  
In September 2002, Khatami went to the majlis to ask for a new bill to be 
submitted to the Council of Guardians and the valy-e faqih asking for greater 
powers within the constitution.  In addition he has also proposed the termination 
of the candidate vetting process and clerical control over the judiciary.  This bill 
was overwhelmingly approved by the majlis but is currently facing an impasse 
within the Council of Guardians.  Khatami has indicated that he would resign if 
the bill does not pass.  Such an action could stir Iran into even greater turmoil.29 
                                                 
26 Zahedi, 182. 
27 CNN Interactive. Transcript of interview with Iranian President Mohammed Khatami. 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html (11 December 2002)  
28  A conclusion drawn by Dr. Ahmad Ghoreishi. 
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2436427.stm  and 
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All of the abovementioned reformist credentials do not spare Khatami the 
ire of the general populace.  This is because twice, the people have gone to the 
polls en masse to elect him and in five years he has had very little to show.  What 
irks the Iranian reformist movement is that the mullahs were able to take 
advantage of the election turnout to validate their system.  This same line of 
thought was also shared by Western observers and as a result, an ever 
increasing number of Iranians feel that Khatami’s liberal stance has given the 
clerical regime undeserved international legitimacy.  Khatami’s cautious 
approach is derived from his acceptance of the valy-e faqih system, a criterion for 
candidacy.  Therefore, he has failed to rally his large following as a bargaining 
chip against his adversaries.  A look at recent events seems to indicate that 
Khatami’s only bargaining chip is his resignation.  Even though the president’s 
resignation could provoke increasing unrest within the country, Iran still has a 
constitution that provides for presidential succession, and it is possible that the 
Council of Guardians could intervene to make sure that the future president 
follows the party line.  In any case, this leads to uncertainty since a presidential 
resignation is unprecedented in Islamic Iran.  Therefore, it appears that the 
popular consensus regarding Khatami is that he act decisively and start a chain 
of events that leads to change, or he get out of the way.30  
C. POLICIES 
The most significant policy provoking disillusionment in Iran is the lack of 
social freedom.  During the Shah’s reign, Iranians had a great amount of social 
freedom but hardly any political freedom.  The arrival of the clerics brought about 
some political freedom, albeit not by choice or intent; and a significant reduction 
in social freedom.  Since the one of the appeals of any revolutionary movement 
according to Stephen Walt is that the disappearance of the old order will bring 
significant benefits, it appears to the Iranian people that in this case the 
revolution has gone in retrograde.31  
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http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/sept02/middleEast.asp (11 December 2002) 
31  Walt, 336 
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About 65 percent of Iranians are under the age of 25. These young people 
have grown up in a country where it is difficult to participate in recreation or 
entertainment, especially with members of the opposite sex.  Having heard tales 
about the significantly greater amount of personal freedom during the Shah’s 
rule, a great many Iranians seek the same privileges their parents had but denied 
them thanks to their support for the revolution.  Globalization has helped 
decrease the rift between Islamic Iran and the rest of the world. Thanks to 
satellite television and the Internet (Iran is the most connected country in the 
Middle East), have cut inroads into the domain of the mullahs.  Globalized mass 
media is one arena, which is difficult for repressive regimes to control.  Many 
stations that beam programming to Iran are in the United States (Los Angeles).32  
The mullahs go to great lengths to block these broadcasts and restrict Internet 
viewing, especially chatrooms. Because of the ever-changing nature of the 
Internet, there is little they can do.  This is a sign of a weak political system 
because a strong system of governance has little to fear of diverging 
viewpoints.33 
Iranian women have borne the brunt of the Islamic regime’s reduction of 
social freedoms since they can no longer divorce, travel freely, or marry non-
Muslim men.  They also lost professionally because they cannot serve in the 
judiciary.  However, a woman is currently Khatami’s vice-president.   
The major drawback is that economic prospects are dim with 5.5 million 
high school graduates and a million university graduates coming to the job 
market each year and hardly having a chance to make a living due to an 
unemployment rate of about 15 percent.  The people need a social outlet, and 
that is denied them.34 
U.S. Iranian relations are a policy area, which with respect to this work is 
not fully controlled by the Iranian government.  It is also different because the 
Iranian people do not share the same views as their government in this matter.  
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http://www.apnic.net/mailing-lists/apple/archive/2001/05/msg00012.html (26 June 2003)  
34 Ahmad Ghoreishi. Where is Iran headed?  
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However, the lack of interaction with the United States, which was once its 
largest trading partner, has hurt Iran greatly.  One of the key sectors where this 
can be felt is in the petroleum sector.  Before the 1979 revolution, Iran produced 
6 million barrels a day, however, since 1979, it has never exceeded 3.7 million.  
This is because most of the technical support for that sector came from the 
United States and lack of spare parts and necessary technology has hampered 
Iran.  This is especially worrisome since the country relies very heavily on oil 
revenue.  The current state of internal strife can only make matters worse for the 
mullahs as they have not the deep pockets with which to bribe the young masses 
into submission, as is the case with the Arab oil monarchies.35 
The Iranian Revolution was the beginning of what has been almost a 
quarter-century of animosity between the United States and Iran.  The Iranian 
Hostage Crisis (1979-81) was the axe that cut the once strong connections 
between the two countries.  Confrontations between American and Iranian forces 
did not help matters especially when the latter was tacitly supporting Saddam 
Hussein in his war against revolutionary Iran.   
The election of Mohammed Khatami brought about indications of a 
rapprochement between the two archenemies.  In his interview with CNN in 1998 
as well as on other occasions, Khatami has appeared willing to risk the wrath of 
the mullahs in order to start dialogue with the United States.  The U.S. 
government viewed Khatami’s appeal as sincere however; the latter also 
understands that the Iranian president is not the one who really calls the shots in 
Iran.  The major U.S. grievances are Iran’s support of terrorist organizations and 
weapons of mass destruction.  And since it has previously been mentioned that 
Khatami is not even the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, it is unlikely he 
can propose any measures in this arena to the satisfaction of the United States36 
Further dialogue between the two nations has been pretty much ruled out 
of the question because of the current War on Terrorism.  The United States has 
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Iran prominently placed on the list of state sponsors of terrorism.  This led to 
President George W. Bush’s inclusion of Iran in his “Axis of Evil.”  By doing so, 
the U.S. president decidedly threw his support behind the Iranian people in their 
struggle for democracy.  A key reason being that some Iranians already think that 
it is bad enough that Khatami’s gestures have brought the theocracy some much 
needed legitimacy in the international scene; however, if the United States, the 
world’s most powerful nation opened dialogue with Khatami, among others, it 
would undercut the position of the dissident movement.  Therefore, as far as the 
dissatisfied are concerned, the United States is actually serving as a 
counterweight against the mullahs.37  
The dissidents’ position is not without merit.  The United States has been 
encouraging countries to become democratic.  The Middle East has bucked the 
trend with its numerous autocratic regimes.  Only Turkey and Israel are 
democratic.  Iran on the other hand, has some semblance of popular participation 
in government.  Therefore, the fall of the clerical regime could lead to the 
adoption of full democracy in Iran more so than in any of its Arab neighbors.   
For over two millennia, Iran has sought to differentiate itself from the rest 
of the Middle East.   Its lifestyle and culture has resisted Arab influence, foreign 
invasions, and political change.  Unlike Turkey, Iran did not take its democratic 
cues from the west but found them through internal means.  During the beginning 
of the twentieth century, the Iranian people sought protection against the arbitrary 
decisions of their government.   This is why the majlis was created in 1908.  It 
was an attempt by the people led by the bazaaris, clergy, and intellectuals to 
check capricious policies of Nassirudin Shah.  The Shah who ruled during the 
late nineteenth century began selling concessions and large tracts of land that 
were not his to cast away to the British.  Bowing to internal pressure, the 
concessions ended and the majlis was created to check the Shah.  From this 
point on, any Iranian ruler who governed arbitrarily has been checked.  The last 
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Shah and his father Reza were no exception, and it can be concluded that the 
mullahs themselves will fall into this category.38   
Today, the arbitrariness of the present government stems from the valy-e 
faqih, Council of Guardians, Ali Khamanei, and Mohammed Khatami.  The 
results are the present economic difficulties and lack of personal and social 
freedom, albeit with a semblance of political freedom to enhance legitimacy.  
Nevertheless, a minority holds the real political power in the country, which is not 
very responsive to the wishes of its citizens.  The Iranians over the years have 
become more educated on average than their Gulf States contemporaries due to 
an arbitrary measure taken by the last two Shahs which sought to emulate Kemal 
Ataturk’s attempts to forcefully push his people into the modern age through 
compulsory education.  Arbitrary or not, the progress made in education could 
not be reversed by the mullahs.  Higher education brings about greater political 
and economic awareness.  This heightened sense of awareness has therefore 
increased the need for political change and the end of the mullahs’ arbitrary self-
serving policies, which are justified by selective interpretation and sometimes 
distortion Iranians Islamic identity.   This action by way of the individuals, 
institutions, and policies has helped stifle Iran’s attempts at progress.  It is also a 
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III. HOW DOES THE THEORY OF RELATIVE DEPRIVATION 
APPLY TO IRAN? 
 
Ardeshir Zahedi in his book The Iranian Revolution Then and Now 
comments on “The Disintegration of the Iranian Revolution” in the introductory 
section of his work.  He dissects the shortcomings of the 1979 revolution into 
three categories: socioeconomic crisis, political oppression, and pervasive 
corruption.  It was after all, an attempt by the Iranian people to remedy shortfalls 
in these aspects of national life that prompted the internal unrest, which led to 
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi’s flight to exile and the beginning of the Islamic 
Republic that was expected to provide social justice and progress for all citizens.  
The various personalities, institutions, and policies of the Islamic government 
have not been able to satisfactorily address the economy, plurality, and 
transparency in a manner sufficient to forestall public dissatisfaction.  As a result, 
such a dilemma, in the case of Iran can be explained by applying the theory of 
Relative Deprivation to the current situation in the country. 
A. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION 
 
Relative Deprivation is a means to arrive at a theory for explaining political 
violence and it is relevant in Iran because all of the major changes of government 
in that Middle Eastern country were accomplished by violent action.  In the case 
of a future change of government there is a strong likelihood that there will be 
further violence; this despite the fact that the world has come to prefer non-
violent handovers of power inspired mostly by the way the Communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe fell in 1989, regime change in South Africa, and the prevailing 
winds of democracy that have touched every continent in the post Cold War 
world.  Relative Deprivation (RD) is defined below: 
[As] a perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations 
and their capabilities.  Value expectations are the goods and 
conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. 
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Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are 
capable of attaining or maintaining given the social means available 
to them.39 
In addition to RD, Iranian governments from the times of the Qajars to the 
Pahlevis and ultimately the mullahs have either willingly or reluctantly given Iran 
what Gurr would call societal conditions that increase the average level or 
intensity of expectations without increasing capabilities thus increasing the 
amount of discontent.  The expectations and capabilities in Iran will be defined 
shortly.40    
Theocratic Iran is a good case study in the realm of RD.  In the previous 
paragraph, there is the mention of increased value capabilities.  This is derived 
from the ability for people to live in conditions which permit individual prosperity 
because foremost in the minds of most people is their ability to provide for 
themselves and their family.  The condition is one of consistent economic 
prosperity.  This leads to a clash between religion and economic prosperity 
because the former is by nature conservative and irrational because it is based 
on faith while the latter is progressive in order to avoid stagnation.  Therefore, a 
regime based on religion has to stifle economic progress because this brings 
about the true value capabilities, which are political participation and the rule of 
law.   
Relative Deprivation is important because of the likelihood of political 
violence.  The more pronounced the discontent, the greater the probability of 
violence because psychological theory about group conflict suggests that there 
would be a general call to take action.  These is when one would return to the 
events in Eastern Europe in 1989 and ask why then was there not great violence 
during the fall of the Communist regimes?  Although this is a valid question, this 
issue should by no means be used to attempt to make sense of events in Iran.  
This is because in a Communist system, the scope of RD is reduced because the 
former Soviet Bloc countries were insulated from what was happening in the 
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West and therefore the population’s expectations were not high.  This is 
illustrated by the construction of the Berlin Wall and the great effort expended by 
the Soviet bloc in keeping western media signals blocked.  Since the 
expectations were low, and a high value was placed on egalitarianism in a 
Communist system, the value capabilities were also kept at a fairly low level.  
Since the differences between value capabilities and expectations were minimal 
there was little incentive for violence.  The Communist system instead went 
bankrupt and had to open up to a more pluralistic form of government.41  
B. CLERICAL LEADERSHIP LACKS CHARISMATIC DEPTH 
 
Valy-e faqih was the consolidation of Khomeini’s thoughts on Islamic 
governance within a single individual who had simultaneously, charismatic, 
political, and legal legitimacy.  The valy-e faqih is accountable to God and is 
above all politics and as a result, the ultimate arbiter of right and wrong.42 This 
brought about a traditional form of leadership much different from a modern 
method by which a leader is chosen based on credentials and their appeal to the 
people.  Khomeini had a significant following within Iran because of his charisma 
and ability to rally opposition to the Shah.  Although it would be ideal to have a 
charismatic leader in charge of any country, it is highly unlikely that the 
successor, in this case Ali Khamanei would be able to live up to the image of the 
late Khomeini.  Khomeini had the political capital to undertake unpopular but 
necessary decisions, the most well known being the termination of the eight-year 
war with Iraq in 1988.  He is reported to have said that “I would rather drink 
poison out of a chalice than accept defeat to Saddam Hussein, but I will have to 
swallow the poison instead.”  Such a statement demonstrated the lack of 
charismatic depth in Iran’s leadership because the leading clerics had to implore 
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Khomeini who was practically on his death bed to make the decision, for they 
knew that the same decision made by any other Iranian would be cause for 
severe domestic instability.43 
What does the abovementioned event signify?  The men who inherited 
Khomeini’s government, the current valy-e faqih, Ali Khamanei, President 
Mohammed Khatami, head of the Council of Expediency: Ali Rafsanjani, and 
head of the judiciary: Ibrahim Yazdi, to name but a few and lacking the political 
capital of Khomeini were invariably transformed into what Charles Ellwood 
mentions in his work The Psychology of Human Society as an immobile and 
inflexible regime.44  As a result of the valy-e faqih and company’s sense of 
insecurity, they must act mostly to preserve their own power therefore becoming 
what another author George Petee calls a barrier to change.  This means that 
one important prerequisite for a new revolution in Iran has been met: 
No revolution can actually occur unless the state has become a 
barrier to change, and the state cannot become a barrier to change 
unless its own form is in someway out of adjustment with the 
society it is supposed to serve.45   
The maladjustment stems from the fact that the mullahs have up to now 
failed to adjust to the changes they helped engineer when the Shah left in 1979.  
An inevitable set of expectations comes with any change in government and in 
Iran there is a high index of value capabilities and expectations, key ingredients 
for a dynamic society.  The problem is that there is a big difference between the 
two.  So the question now would be what these value capabilities and 
expectations are? 
C. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AT WORK 
 
Value capabilities are what the people perceive themselves as capable of 
attaining and maintaining.  The limiting factor is the combination of all values, 
which the nation is capable of distributing to its people.  This in turn is limited by:  
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…extensive resources and a demonstrated capability to convert 
them into more satisfying conditions of life, and it people have a 
reasonable opportunity for sharing its benefits, the value 
capabilities are bound to be high.46   
Iran is a country with extensive resources.  It is the second largest 
exporter of crude oil in the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC), the 
cartel that controls most of the world’s fossil fuel production.  In addition to which 
Iran home to almost a tenth of the world’s proven crude oil reserves and fifteen 
percent of natural gas reserves.  The wealth derived from such resources if used 
wisely can be transformed into assets that can be used for the benefit of most of 
the country.  The use of the word “most” is because in any society it is impractical 
to satisfy everybody.47  
D. ECONOMIC VALUES 
 
One of the objectives of the 1979 revolution as Zahedi states below was: 
[The promise] to create an economically developed and 
independent Iran in which the fruits of economic growth and 
prosperity were to be combined with equity and social justice.  Civil 
liberties as well as the right of citizens to petition their government 
through the formation of voluntary associations and political parties 
were to be assured.48 
The mullahs have failed to live up to any measure of this post-
revolutionary promise.  The continued decline of the Iranian economy as well as 
policies enacted by the mullahs especially the late Ayatollah Khomeini is to 
blame.  The first of such policies was the aggravated animosity towards the 
United States.  The Shah was a treasured ally of the United States and as a 
result, large-scale investment especially from the West flowed into Iran.  This 
investment made it possible to develop Iran’s petroleum sector in order to permit 
the efficient export of crude oil, which was and still is the principal foreign 
exchange earner.  After the Shah fell from power, the revolutionaries set their 
sights on the United States.  This was during the interlude between the Shah’s 
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departure for Egypt and the consolidation of power by the mullahs.  The result 
was the seizing of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran and the hostage crisis, which 
lasted over a year.  Although the mullahs consolidated their power after the 
hostages were taken, it was Khomeini’s insistence on keeping the crisis going in 
order to gain ever increasing popularity and inflict a black eye on the most 
powerful nation on earth and justify his divine credentials that blocked all hopes 
of restoring a meaningful relationship with the United States.49  After all the 
embassy was stormed in November 1979, but the United States only broke 
diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1979.  The falling out with the United States 
stopped the influx of foreign investment since most American companies left Iran 
and other western companies saw the country as too unstable to continue to do 
business in.   
When American and other western companies were conducting a large 
volume of business in Iran, a large section of the population felt cheated because 
the rewards were heavily distributed among those who were well connected with 
the Pahlevis.  The intellectuals who were opposed to the Shah also saw Iran as a 
country pursuing a course of dependent economic growth.  This was the 
economic condition the mullahs who ultimately gained power during the 
revolution promised to address.50  
After the revolution, Iran nationalized most of the large-scale industries 
that were built with foreign assistance and capital.  Other foreign investments 
were appropriated by the regime.  The same fate befell the Shah’s vast land 
holdings.  A large portion of these assets were distributed the bonyads.  With the 
sudden influx of funds, the bonyads were able to gradually acquire a very 
dominant role in Iran’s non-petroleum sector.  One of the biggest examples is the 
case of the bazaaris.   
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The bazaaris are the equivalent of what small-scale business people in 
any western economy.  The bazaaris have been well established in Iranian 
society for centuries and have been for the greater part of time living in a rather 
comfortable wedge between ordinary people and the clerical elite.  The bazaaris 
range from ordinary street vendors to large-scale merchants.  They normally 
have the blessing of the mullahs because in Muslim tradition, a fraction of their 
income is paid to charity in the form of zakat, one of the pillars of Islam.51 
Before the revolution, the Shah, in a bid to develop the country during his 
lifetime, counted on huge amounts of foreign investment.  The bazaaris stood to 
loose from this aspect of modernization because Iran in the 1960’s and 70’s did 
not have solid financial institutions to absorb the windfall petroleum profits.  
Thanks to the oil boom, inflation spiraled and the bazaaris could not keep pace 
with it.  Adding to the bazaaris woes, the introduction of large foreign 
supermarket chains began to cut into their profits.  Therefore the bazaaris were 
eager to throw in their lot with the revolutionaries in order to get rid of the Shah.  
The arrival of the mullahs was seen as a blessing given their previous 
coexistence.52   
The mullahs, in a bid to institutionalize their control over Iranian society 
made the bonyads powerful because the sizable assets that were appropriated 
from international business concerns had to be retained within politically reliable 
circles.   Zahedi gives an example of the bazaaris plight: 
The bazaaris have not been exempted from state taxes and 
customs duties, nor have they been given a free hand in 
determining prices.  Indeed, the theocracy has proved itself to be 
just as harsh, even more severe than the monarchy in controlling 
and repressing segments of the bazaari community.  The theocracy 
has even resorted to executing dissident bazaaris, a course of 
action not entertained by the Shah.53   
Theodore Gurr asserts that economic values can be sorted into six 
important categories.  These are the availability of natural resources; the 
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technology and skills to make use of such resources; labor to apply those skills to 
the resources at hand; capital to provide labor with the tools to work; societal 
structures capable of organizing these factors of production and distributing the 
output; and systems of beliefs that make cooperation possible in order to 
produce and distribute goods and services.  A significant reduction in the ability 
to provide conditions for any of these six categories to flourish will bring about 
economic stagnation.54 
Oil reserves have brought about a certain amount of wealth to the country 
it accounts for about 90 percent of the government’s foreign exchange earnings 
therefore the first category is satisfied.55   
Technology and skills to make use of the oil wealth is in Iran’s case is of 
cardinal importance.  Although the oil reserves in Saudi Arabia and Iraq are by 
far the largest in the world, Iran is not far behind, and geographically, it controls 
the longest coastline along the Persian Gulf through which half of the world’s oil 
is transported.  It would be foolhardy to write-off Iran after all the 1953 coup that 
overthrew Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq took place because he 
nationalized Iranian oil.  The absence of American know-how has hurt Iran’s 
petroleum sector. To put this in perspective, in 1977 the last year of the Shah’s 
regime with relative political stability, an average of between 5 and 6 million 
barrels of crude oil were exported from Iran.  By 2002, Iran managed only 4 
million.  (FIGURE 2) In contrast, Saudi Arabia in 1977 exported about 9 million 
barrels of crude and with 8 million in 2002.  Saudi Arabia’s production never 
dipped below 8 million for the corresponding time period.  These figures 
demonstrate that the lack of American entrepreneurial skill and technological 
advice have kept Iran from developing additional oil extraction capability from the 
Persian Gulf and the Caspian Basin resulting in the country’s inability to produce 
to full capacity at a time when its own internal consumption has risen significantly 
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thanks to a Khomeini inspired population boom in the 1980’s.56 (FIGURE 2)  
Currently, Iran does not even meet its OPEC production quotas.  As a result, 
other oil producing nations are robbing Iran of much needed income.57 
Iran has the labor to put the petroleum resources to work for it.  With a 
population of 65.1 million in 2001, Iran is the most populous country in the Middle 
East.  Since the reign of Reza Shah, there has been a significant push for 
education in Iran.  Of all the Gulf States, Iran has one of the lowest illiteracy rates 
in all of the Middle East and North Africa with only 15 percent in contrast to the 
latter’s average of 34 percent.  This means that there are 34 million literate 
people, a population larger than that of all the Gulf States combined except 
Iraq.58  This description of literacy in Iran is not meant to imply that there is an 
abundance of people with the exact skills necessary to make Iran self sufficient in 
the qualified manpower necessary for proper conversion of natural resources.  It 
however addresses the fact that Iran, with higher literacy levels has a better 
intellectual baseline that it’s Middle Eastern counterparts which in turn equates to 
higher potential.  This potential helps accentuate RD if it is not being used 
properly because in the case of Iran, the fourth category, the capital to provide 
labor with the tools to work is diminished.  The educated populace expects to be 
able to adequate work but due to the lack of capital there is reduced ability to 
provide work outside the civil service or petroleum skills.  The Iranian civil service 
was about 800,000 strong during the Shah’s last year in power.  By 1993, it 
reached an astonishing 3 million strong.  This almost four-fold increase in public 
sector workers has not corresponded with a similar increase in revenues.59  
Capital as mentioned previously in this work comes mostly from foreign 
investment and secondarily from private Iranian ventures.  Thanks to the Iran 
Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996 the United States can sanction any company 
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that conducts over $40 million in business with Iran or Libya.  ILSA, extended by 
President George W. Bush in August 2001 for five more years, has hampered 
Iran’s ability to borrow money from foreign creditors.60  ILSA has rendered Iran 
ineligible to participate in debt servicing with the Paris Club of Bankers, an 
informal organization that helps coordinate solutions to help developing countries 
service debt.  As a result, Iran had to negotiate bilateral agreements with 19 
different countries!61  The capital generated by the bazaaris would not be 
sufficient to provide an adequate tax base from which the government could 
generate revenues on the scale necessary to make up for both the shortfall in oil 
and foreign investment.  Further aggravating the labor issue is the significant 
increase of Iran’s population after the revolution. (FIGURE 3) Shortly after 
Khomeini became supreme leader, Iran was invaded by Iraq.  Since Iran 
embarked on a very anti-western ideological stance, most of the developed world 
threw their lot behind Iraq.  The United States was no exception to this trend and 
in the hopes of frustrating the new theocracy it tacitly supported Iraq.  Khomeini 
had few friends but thanks to the military ineptness of Saddam Hussein, Iran 
managed to occupy important tracts of Iraqi territory through persistent human 
wave attacks.  This prompted the valy-e faqih to ask Iranians to have more 
children causing the population to double over the last generation.  These war 
inspired children have come of age and also need to be absorbed into the 
workforce.62 
The societal structure capable of distributing the output of the Iranian 
economy is corrupted because of the government’s mismanagement of the 
economy, which has hampered the absorption of new university graduates into 
the economy.  The bazaari community can be divided into the enfranchised and 
the disenfranchised.  The former are the bazaaris who are well connected with 
                                                 
60 U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs. 
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01080303.htm (9 March 2003)  
61 Paris Club. Presentation. 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/presentation/presentation.php?BATCH=B01WP01 (9 March 2003) 
and Zahedi, 5-6.  
62 Zahedi,4. 
 34
the regime.  There has been significant mention of the malaise of the Iranian 
government’s revenues in this work.  Part of the malaise spreads towards the 
area of foreign exchange reserves which as of early 2003 amount to $15 billion 
against an external debt of $23 billion.63  The low foreign exchange reserves 
translate into reduced ability to import goods and services and in turn raise the 
price of hard currency in Iran.  The enfranchised bazaaris have access to hard 
currency at the official rate while the not so well connected have to settle for the 
unofficial exchange rate, which is more realistic.  By conducting such policies, the 
government is subsidizing the importers connected to the regime with its meager 
hard currency assets.64  The connected bazaaris are able to reap an unfair 
advantage when redistributing their goods and services within the country 
because they can trade at market prices.  They do not pay taxes; therefore, the 
government gains little by sponsoring them.  Viewed from the mullah’s prism, 
such unsound economic policies are the price of conducting business; albeit a 
very expensive one.  The anti-inflationary measures of the Rafsanjani presidency 
magnified the woes of the ordinary bazaaris.  Incidentally, Rafsanjani was able to 
enrich his family through the export-import business.65 The mullahs’ attitudes 
towards the inflationary problems are best summarized by this extract: 
…the Islamic Republic has been unwilling to shoulder responsibility 
for inflation.  Seeking to mollify public opinion, the regime has 
blamed inflation on hoarding and price gouging on the part of 
bazaaris, among other factors.  In addition, it has engaged in the 
imposition of price controls which are considered anathema from 
the perspective of the bazaaris. 66 
The mullahs face a danger within the realm of RD by undertaking such 
appeasing policies.  According to Gurr, if the economic expectations of some 
groups, in this case the customers increase (price stabilization measures 
produce a measure of hope) there is a higher propensity towards political 
violence because the economy is stagnant.  The reason for this is that the 
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government can induce the perception of rising economic capability by suddenly 
curbing inflation and allowing the people’s money to stretch farther by taking 
symbolic actions against the bazaaris or other perceived economic enemies.   If 
there is no similar increase in the people’s economic value, then there is the 
potential for discontent because the government’s measures would ring hollow 
after a period of time.67  This brings about the final category, the system of beliefs 
that makes cooperation possible in order to distribute goods is compromised 
because of the inconsistency with which the mullahs dictate economic policy.  All 
of the economic measures described so far demonstrate that the Iranian 
government applies fiscal policy in manners, which are convenient in order to 
retain its hold on power.  By acting in this form, the government induces the 
perception that it is occasionally acting on the people’s behalf, and on other 
times, acting against them.  By constantly raising and reducing expectations, the 
mullahs walk a fine line between stability and unrest.  This does not mean that in 
all cases, there will be violence that will be of magnitude to topple the regime.  
There is an important caveat.   
Financial well-being is the easiest measure of popular satisfaction 
because it is essential for physical existence.  Most people therefore notice small 
changes in income.  Iran’s economy has not yet fallen to the subsistence level.  
Life is hard for people but there is no government-induced starvation like in 
neighboring Iraq where food was used as patronage for regime loyalists due to 
United Nations sanctions.  When the economy falls to subsistence levels, the 
people begin to be more preoccupied with their daily survival.  At this point, they 
are incapable of rebellion.  This was the situation inside Iraq, but not in Iran.68   
E. PARTICIPATORY EXPECTATION 
 
The principal reason the Iranian people wanted to get rid of the Shah was 
because of the lack of political freedom due to his neopatrimonial regime.  There 
was an abundance of social freedom as women were freed from the veil and 
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allowed to attend schools.  Aside from the social arena, the Iranian people had 
very little say in their government.  The more educated people become, the more 
aware they are about their political and economic situation and they seek 
freedom to influence it.  For the most part, only the well connected benefited and 
the Iranian intellectuals of the day were bought off by the Shah, exiled, or 
violently repressed at home.   
A distinguished Iranian sociologist of pre-revolutionary times, Ali Shairiati 
believed that Iranian identity was bound with Shi’a Islam.  In his very anti-
imperialist poetry, Shariati saw the road to Iranian resurrection in the adherence 
to “true Islam.”  Shariati died in 1977 at the age of 44 in London.  Although the 
British coroners declared his death as a result of a heart attack, he was believed 
to have been murdered by the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK.  Whether this is true 
or pure speculation remains to be proved, however, in his martyrdom, Shariati’s 
beliefs served as added justification for the creation of a religious state as 
evidenced in this extract: 
True Islam is on the side of the disinherited who are enjoined to act 
in order to bring about the realization of a just society.  Shariati 
equated justice with equality and argued that it could only be 
realized in a religiously inclined, classless social order. …Shariati 
maintained that the forces of injustice in the modern world were 
embodied in arbitrary despotic rule, imperialism, and Zionism.69 
Combining Shairiati’s claim with a work by Peter Pulzer on ideological 
appropriateness, it can be inferred that when the Shah was tottering on the brink 
and a disorganized opposition was seeking the end of his rule; the rallying of the 
revolutionaries, accomplished through the organizational expression of Shi’a 
Islam the exploitation of the Iranian people’s spirituality towards the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic.70 
Shariati’s reasoning fit the philosophies of Khomeini like a glove.  
Khomeini believed that the religiously inclined society should be led by a valy-e 
faqih who was above all politics and served as a supreme judge and interpreter 
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of the Qu’ran in his capacity as marja'-e taqlid (top religious reference). With this 
justification in hand, Khomeini in 1979 was declared valy-e faqih.  In this position, 
he was commander in chief of the armed forces, had the power to declare war or 
peace, to call for referenda, and name the president.  Although the Iranian 
President who acts as the head of state is popularly elected, the valy-e faqih has 
to sign a decree before he can assume the position.71 
The vetting of candidates by the clerics leads to the ultimate 
disenfranchisement of the people despite regular elections. The people do not 
have any say in the power that matters, that of the valy-e faqih.  This results in a 
dictatory-e sulaha (dictatorship of the pious).  A fact further reinforced by the 
current valy-e faqih’s lack of marja'-e taqlid credentials leading Khomeini to 
amend the rules for succession of the supreme leadership.72   Abbas Abdi 
describes this situation as a presidency which serves as a mere executive 
assistant and a majlis (parliament) that is only a consultative body.73 
The problem is that the proportion of political elite positions (mullahs) to 
political participants is very low and unlike Gurr’s implication that the incumbents 
are reluctant to be replaced (which is fundamentally true), very few people have 
the means and connections to become a mullah, especially one of high standing 
such as an ayatollah-Islam.   The conventional remedy for such a situation would 
be: 
If the participatory value position of ordinary citizens is low, their 
value capabilities can readily be expanded in almost any type of 
political system by the development of political party organizations, 
interest associations, expansion of franchise and increased 
frequency of elections.74 
Gurr argues that participatory expansion of this sort is normally opposed 
by elites.  This is valid in Iran.  The participatory dimension brings to light the 
problems surrounding a traditional form of leadership.  Khomeini had religious 
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credentials to fill his tailor made valy-e faqih position and simultaneously serve as 
a marja'-e taqlid. At the same time he ruled Iran as a shrewd politician.  
Traditional forms of leadership rely mostly on messianic figures and it would be 
unreasonable to expect a successor to have the same disposition.  Khamanei 
has been measured against his predecessor with only one favorable comparison, 
his skillful mastery of politics.  When Khomeini changed the valy-e faqih 
requirements shortly before he died in the summer of 1989 he opened the 
theocracy’s legitimacy to question because if the Allah has designated infallible 
Imams as his representatives on earth to rule the people and for the latter to 
discover his wisdom and submit to the valy-e faqih’s leadership, then why is the 
present supreme leader not as religiously wise as he is supposed to be?  This is 
perhaps a question that can only be answered by Khomeini; however, he is dead 
and buried.  Given this discrepancy, it is apparent that the theocracy is hollow 
and that maybe sovereignty should be derived from man rather than the 
Almighty. 75   With Khomeini’s death, the regime lost its charismatic and political 
legitimacy.  Instead of trying to bolster the regime’s legal legitimacy, a more 
reasonable approach given the transparency and objectivity of laws, Khamanei 
tried to hone charismatic qualities.  He fell short.76  
Gurr establishes the connection between regime legitimacy and political 
violence stemming from dissatisfaction.  He states that if the people feel that their 
government is proper, only very strong countervailing motives would encourage 
people to act against it.  If a highly legitimate regime as was Iran during the days 
of Khomeini, embarks on an unpopular policy such as accepting defeat in the war 
with Iraq, there is bound to be some protest because such an action although 
necessary is inconsistent with the regime’s image.  That is why the leading 
mullahs asked Khomeini to accept the United Nations moves to end hostilities.  
On the other hand, if the regime fails to respond to pressures to reform, 
participatory RD increases to the point where violence is directed towards the 
policies and incumbents who imposed the latter.  A good example is the Hashemi 
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Aghajari controversy.  Dr. Aghajari was sentenced to death by the Iranian 
judiciary in late 2002.  Because of the great upheaval surrounding this decision, 
his death sentence has floated from appeal to appeal because of the mullahs’ 
reluctance to face the consequences of Aghajari’s execution.  This is what can 
be explained in RD theory as the last resort, which transforms a legitimate form 
of government (because the mullahs claim of popular validation through 
elections) into an illegitimate institution.  People who regard their regimes as 
legitimate have little incentive for political violence because there is a satisfactory 
means to redress dissatisfaction.  When this is not the case, the climate is ripe 
for political violence as has been the case especially after Aghajari’s death 
sentence.77 
The term mullah has been used a great deal so far.  Although Iran is a 
theocracy, the mullahs are not a monolithic bloc; especially since the death of 
Khomeini.  The next chapter examining the coercive balance will discuss that in 
greater detail.  Khomeini commanded enough respect since he was a marja'-e 
taqlid to keep the clerics united and quell disputes internal to the clerical 
leadership.  Khamanei’s is unable to wield the same power; however, he does 
keep the mullahs united to a considerable extent, mostly through the patronage 
described in the economics section.  The most notable rift within the mullocracy 
comes from Ali Montazeri. In February 1989, he wrote the following to Khomeini: 
In these ten years, we have shouted slogans which were wrong 
and which have isolated us in the world and have alienated the 
people from the regime-there was no necessity for such slogans…I 
hope there will be a change now that we are entering the second 
decade…I hope the next decade will not be full of slogans but 
deeds…We need a major change in the country’s management.78  
Montazeri, who was supposed to be Khomeini’s successor as valy-e faqih 
was promptly disinherited and sent to Qom where he has been in house arrest 
since 1989.  Montazeri is a good case of elite RD.  What he envisioned as 
expectations for the regime, two-way respectability from people and government, 
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as well as social justice and prosperity were not realized in the decade after 
1979.  As a result, Iran’s dire straits have brought discredit upon the mullahs.  
Such discredit has therefore made the clerics oppressors.  Since the advent of 
Islam in Iran, and the nature of Shiism with its hierarchy, the clerical institution 
has always been a buffer between the state and the people.  Now that the clerics 
are in power, they have lost stature because of their insistence in retaining 
power. An insistence which can be understood because many of them endured 
long prison terms and other brutalities imposed by the Shah before they had their 
day of glory and ascended to Iran’s leadership.79  Thus it can be inferred that 
mullahs such as Montazeri who has been described by Moshen Khadivar, leader 
of an Iranian association fighting for press freedom as “the spiritual father of 
Iranians who believe in the rule of law and democracy” has seen the indications 
of RD in Iran and wants to avert the total discredit of the Shi’a clergy.  Montazeri 
is kept in house arrest because the leadership believes that if he is released, he 
would become the focal point for reform.   
Relative Deprivation always exists in some shape or form in any society.  
It is the magnitude of such deprivation, which increases the probability of political 
violence geared towards the end of the existing regime.  It is not easy to live 
within the confines of “divine legitimacy” when it is apparent that there are 
inherent flaws in the people who believe themselves to be the messengers of 
God on earth.  This is further accentuated by the apparatus of the state deciding 
upon the definition of the Almighty.  Hence a serious condition where the valy-e 
faqih operating as the ultimate authority, is accountable to no one.80  Shi’a Islam 
and strong levels of faith are associated with Iranian society.  However, part of 
the expectation in faith is that some expectations will be realized and in effect, 
the flock is satisfied with not being able to see or identify the Almighty save for 
during prayer or thought.  This has been corrupted in Iran because the mullahs 
have made faith appear to be real and tangible and as a result of unmet 
expectations, the people are starting not to like the elements of faith that they 
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witness on a daily basis.  This might be the theory behind Ayatollah Montazeri’s 
reasoning and his attempts to save the faith by severing its ties to the state.  The 
apparatus of state, legitimate, or illegitimate, is source of great amounts of power 
and deference.  Only the mature are able to step away from such power after 
their mandates.  In Iran, the mandate comes from God and not the people; 
therefore, individuals feel that they no control over their own destinies.  These 
discrepancies have to be settled, but since it is hard for the mullahs to step down, 
the longer the settling of accounts is put off, the greater the violence needed to 
settle them, hence the theory of Relative Deprivation is alive and well in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.  
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FIGURE 2. 
Iranian population pyramid: 
Note the increase of births after the revolution and six years into the Iran-Iraq 
War. 
By 2003, the people born during the Iran-Iraq War are now teenagers.  The civil 
service is already lagging behind in the employment of the 25 to 50 year olds. It 










The population problem is further aggravated when the post-revolutionary 
generation reaches its most productive age (20-50).  Iran will need an increase in 
revenues greater than the increase in population as well as a corresponding 
increase in productivity in order to keep them employed. Given Iran’s situation, 
this is unlikely.  
FIGURE 3. 
Oil Production:  
Since sanctions were imposed on Iran by the United States, the country has not 
come close to producing to its capacity.  The rise in internal consumption can be 
accounted for by the increase in population. Source: U.S. Department of Energy: 













IV. WHAT IS THE IRANIAN COERCIVE BALANCE? 
 
The June 2003 riots in Teheran, Shiraz, and Tabriz were significant 
because this was the first time that massive rioting took place simultaneously in 
places other then Teheran.  These riots coupled with the mullahs’ reluctance to 
follow through on Aghajari’s punishment, prompt observers to ask whether the 
Iranian government possesses enough long term coercive power to back up its 
policies.  Another dimension to this issue is whether the Iranian opposition has 
enough coercive capability to make the mullahs succumb to government reform? 
This leads to what Theodore Gurr, a scholar of social revolutions calls the 
Coercive Balance theory.  
A. COERCIVE BALANCE THEORY: FORCE AND COUNTER FORCE 
 
Theodore Gurr discusses how social discontent can be politicized leading 
to political violence.  In the study of the violent aspect of regime changes, the 
coercive balance between the incumbents and dissidents is analyzed.  As the 
people are threatened by the regime, they try to defend themselves.  The 
mullahs cannot afford to show weakness and have to crack down on dissent.  
This leads to what is aptly named force and counterforce.81  If the mullahs 
respond to force with increasing counterforce, there will be an escalation of 
political violence.  Counterforce will be linked to the present regime because in 
Iran today, they do not have the initiative and thus have to react to the people’s 
actions.  According to Gurr, there are two limitations on the escalating spiral of 
force and counterforce: one group will have to run out of coercive resources first 
or attain the capacity of genocidal victory over its opponents.82  
Ardeshir Zahedi states that regardless of social scientists theoretical 
inclinations regarding social revolution, one thing remains constant: a military 
breakdown of the old regime is necessary for any social revolution to succeed. 
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Against a well-led and disciplined military, armed and unarmed masses have little 
hope of victory.83  Put into an Iranian context, observers during the 1979 
revolution believed that the Shah would not fall because if his formidable U.S. 
supplied military forces were unleashed, civil unrest would end.  This is where 
the military leadership issue comes to a head.   Since the Shan prevaricated in 
the face of adversity, there was a breakdown of military leadership and the well-
equipped military forces and chains of command broke down.84  
B. INCUMBENTS 
 
Both sides of the coercive balance have ideologies, institutions, and 
leadership.  Solid evidence of all three is necessary for the success of either 
side.  The incumbents will be analyzed first. The theocratic leadership is also 
divided into its own factions.  However, these factions control the organs of 
coercion under the legitimacy of the valy-e faqih.  Mehdi Moslem, in his book 
Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran claims that there is rivalry between the 
populist and revolutionary dimensions of the regime: 
As a result, based on their religio-revolutionary credentials and the 
fact that they are under the authority of the faqih the different 
factions are unaccountable to the central government, the nehads 
(revolutionary bodies) have frequently challenged the dominance 
and policies of the republican institutions as they have independent 
sources of legitimacy, sovereignty, and authority outside the central 
government.85 
There are three important factions within the mullocracy.  The first faction 
is the “Line of the Imam” (LOI), which was the Late Ayatollah Khomeini’s favorite 
faction.  Members of the LOI were Khomeini’s most faithful supporters and were 
considered by him to be the “true supporters of the Prophet Muhammad.” During 
the majlis elections of 1987, Khomeini made sure that members of the LOI got 
seats in the body by urging them to break away from the rival Combatant Clergy 
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Association (CCA).  The LOI believe in the export of the revolution, suppression 
of political, ethnic and religious dissidents, and centralized economics.86 
When Khomeini died in 1989, in a bid to save himself from being upstaged 
by his predecessor, the new valy-e faqih, Ali Khamanei, began to purge the LOI 
from the majlis.  President Rafsanjani, a staunch member of the LOI, switched 
sides to the CCA. In 1992, the LOI followers had only 40 seats in the 270 seat 
majlis. This is when the security forces: Committee for the Iranian Revolution 
also known as the Komiteh (KII) and the Gendarmerie were merged.  All LOI 
members were purged from the security forces.  The CCA holds most of the 
seats in the Assembly of Experts, the Guardian Council, Society of Theological 
Scholars (Qom) and the Secretariat of Friday Prayer Leaders.  In addition, the 
CCA controls all of the powerful bonyads resulting in about 80 percent of Iran’s 
economic activity.   They believe in the valy-e faqih and pragmatic foreign policy.  
The CCA opposes the bazaari institution save for the ones they control through 
the bonyads. 87   This is the most important faction for the obvious reason that it 
led by the valy-e faqih. It plays host to the most important coercive forces of the 
regime that are supported by its relative commercial might in Iran.  As a result, 
the CCA merits a more detailed look.  
The Iranian constitution provides for a separation of powers but not central 
accountability so one government branch may occasionally be made stronger 
than the others in order to satisfy the demands of current politics.  One of these 
branches in the Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) charged with 
safeguarding the revolution and from internal threats and ensuring the purity of 
the revolution.  The IRGC is therefore independent of the army.88   
Upon the election of Khatami in 1997, the IRGC commander of the time, 
Rahim Safavi, declared: “We do not interfere in politics but if we see that the 
foundations of our system of government and our revolution are threatened…we 
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get involved.”  This shows complete lack of respect for government institutions on 
the part of another body that derives legitimacy from the valy-e faqih.  Safavi’s 
declaration shows what kind of resistance, dissidents are up against.89 
On similar lines, the powerful bonyads (Islamic Charity foundations) 
enable the faqih the flexibility to apply pressure to dissidents and relieve 
international pressure.  Salman Rushdie, author of the infamous book Satanic 
Verses had a fatwa (religious decree) calling for his execution.  This among with 
other Iranian hits against various dissidents earned the theocracy increased 
international animosity.  In 1996, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced that the 
government would no longer pursue the fatwa.  The leader of the Fifteenth of 
Khordad bonyad, Ayatollah Hassan Sane’i doubled the price on his head and 
proclaimed that fatwas issued by the former valy-e faqih were irreversible.  With 
this, he enhanced his legitimacy because he upheld Khomeini’s policy and at the 
same time provided a means for the central government to pursue Rushdie if it 
so desired.90 
Hezbolahis are considered the ultimate stalwarts of the theocracy. They 
do not apply to one particular faction within the theocracy but are rather accepted 
as individuals who are highly religious and guard the principles of the regime.  
The best known of the hezbolahis are the basijis.  There are dissident factions 
who address themselves as hezbolahis but in Iran, this is a term used mostly to 
acknowledge the neo-fundamentalists (Jame ‘eh-e ye Hizbollah).  In 1992, the 
basijis were legitimized in a two-step process.  The first was the government’s 
increase of funding for local mosques in order to increase popular religious 
awareness and practices.  The next event was the majlis enactment of the “Law 
of Legal Protection for the Basiji.” The 1992 law permitted the basiji to assist law 
enforcement agencies in fighting crimes around the country.91   
The 1994 riots in Ghazvin raised the basiji to prominence and they 
eventually became the informal praetorian guard of the regime.  The basiji is 
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informal in the sense that they are outsourced to the mosques, which provide for 
the upkeep of the men. The local mosques keep close relationships with the 
bonyads.  This is thanks to the fifth pillar of Islam, Zakat, which dictates that 
every Muslim must donate a fraction of his or her income to a charity.  The 
bonyads hence sponsor the mosque and subsequently the basiji.92  
Evidence of factionalism within the leadership circle is demonstrated when 
Moshen Rezai as leader of the IRGC in 1996 stated that the guards will oppose 
the entry of liberals into the majlis even if they were elected.  This was a harder 
line taken to restore some measure of respect after the loss of face in Ghazvin. 
Apparently, this loss of face has not been completely restored since in November 
2002, Ali Khamanei said that if student riots continued in protest of Aghajari’s 
death sentence, he would be forced to call on the dedicated Muslims to restore 
order.93 
These rifts cause a crisis of confidence in Iran today.  The first aspect is 
the peoples questioning of the legitimacy of the theocracy because the 
fundamentals of Islamic and republican governance were never reconciled.  
Khomeini’s death left the job unfinished.94   To defeat challenges, the mullahs 
must be able to provide a united front.  So far, they have been able to act 
decisively when their collective interests are threatened.  The procrastination in 
finalizing Aghajari’s legal status is beginning to show some strains in the 
mullocracy.95 
Ali Rafsanjani parted ways with Khamanei because the latter begun to 
remove Rafsanjani’s protégés from the security posts they were given during the 
massive security mergers of the early 1990’s. Rafsanjani formed the Servants of 
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Construction (SOC) in 1995, the third and latest faction. The SOC is a relatively 
new faction that chose Gholah Karbaschi, former mayor of Teheran as its 
Secretary General.96   
Iran is different from most Middle East states in that the security forces are 
not established to keep one individual or ethnicity in power at the expense of all 
others but to maintain the clerical hold on the reins of power.  To achieve such 
ends, efficiency is sacrificed.  Iran’s coercive apparatus is therefore divided into 
three major sectors.  The first is the Interior Ministry’s Law Enforcement Forces 
(Niruha-yi Entezami-yi Jomhuri-yi Islami).  They engage in such activities as 
enforcing public morality standards and cracking down on the media.97  The 
Ministry of Intelligence and Security, (Vezarat-i Ettelaat va Amniyat-i Keshvar 
(MOIS) normally cracks down on overseas dissidents.  This organization 
absorbed the successor of the Pahlevi’s SAVAK Sazeman Ettela’at va Keshvar), 
SAVAMA (Sazeman Ettela’at va Amniateh Mihan) in 1984.98   Overseas 
operations are supplemented by the Jerusalem Force (Qods), a branch of the 
IRGC.  Ali Khamanei’s Combatant Clergy Association is firmly in control of all of 
the significant coercive elements in Iran.  
 Finally, the Iranian armed forces are responsible for external defense.  
Although this work is only concerned with coercive elements that can frustrate 
the opposition, the military is important with respect to its history.  Because the 
Iranian military was inherited from the Shah, there was and still is considerable 
distrust focused towards it.  The army is therefore deployed far away from the 
capital Teheran guarding Iran’s extensive land frontiers with special emphasis on 
archenemy Iraq and Afghanistan.99  
Jane’s Intelligence Review describes some of the important security 
legislation in Iran and begins with the United Security Forces Bill of 1990.  The 
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significance of this legislation is that after Khomeini’s death, factional politics in 
the higher reaches of the theocracy was threatening the valy-e faqih’s control of 
the security forces.  Unable to control them as Khomeini had, he had President 
Rafsanjani organize a merger between the Armed Forces Logistical Agency and 
the IRGC.  The Committee of the Iranian Revolution (Komiteh e Inquelab e 
Islami) was merged with the gendarmerie and police.  This reduced the number 




Although the mullocracy is fragmented, the opposition is in far worse 
shape.  By and large, opposition to the clerical regime is vast.  The majority of 
university students and private citizens feel alienated by the mullahs, hence the 
unrest.  Iranian opposition ranges from monarchists to Marxists.  The 
monarchists are divided between the Arya Mehr, Derafsh Kavyani, and Pars.  
The Washington based lobbyists are the American Iranian Council (AIC), Persian 
Watch Council (PWC), World Political Action Committee (WPAC), and the 
Iranians for International Cooperation (IIC).  The Marxists which were embodied 
in the pre-revolutionary Tudeh lost their moral compass with the fall of the Soviet 
Union and are still looking for some sort of alignment.101 
Such is the fragmentation of the opposition that the Ministry of Intelligence 
and Security (MOIS) has found it rather easy to target dissidents in exile.  One of 
the most well known cases being the murder of the Shah’s last Prime Minister, 
Shapour Bakhtiar in Paris in the early 1980’s and the Mykonos incident where 
four Kurdish dissidents were killed in Berlin. This last incident triggered an arrest 
warrant issued by Germany on the Minister of Intelligence and Security, Ali 
Fallahian-Khuze.  MOIS attributed the killing to “rogue” elements in 1999.  A 
notorious MOIS operative Saeed Emami “committed suicide” in prison.  He was 
being held for the murder of Dariush and Parvaneh Foruhar in 1998.  Although 
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the last two incidents were setbacks for the regime, it showed that the long arm 
of the mullahs had a worldwide reach.  Dissidents have been assassinated in 
every continent.  Thanks to the bonyads the regime has deniability, although it is 
hollow because such subcontracting is enabled by the legitimacy the foundations 
have by following the dictums of the late Ayatollah Khomeini.102  
D. CONSISTENT COMPLIANCE AND FLEETING COMPLIANCE 
 
Coercive control, the ability for either side to have consistent compliance 
with the leadership’s directives is paramount.  In the case of the revolution’s 
guardians, the IRGC, there is an acute case of fleeting compliance: evidence of 
this was during the Ghazvin incident and the 1997 elections in which Mohammed 
Khatami won in a landslide but IRGC personnel voted for the reformist oriented 
president in higher proportions than the general populace.  Khatami received 
about 70 percent of the IRGC vote.  On the other hand, 24 senior IRGC officers 
wrote a letter to Khatami urging that he get a “grip” of the situation during the 
1999 student riots in Teheran.  Interestingly enough, there was little that Khatami 
could do to restore order since he did not control much in the way of coercive 
capability.  The IRGC was still trying to save face from Ghazvin and the basiji 
had to join in the riot control efforts.103  
The emergence of fleeting compliance within the coercive forces of the 
regime leads to a need for positive and negative sanctions.  This shows the 
potential of regime vulnerability.  According to Gurr, two things have to occur, 
praise or censure of the offending parties (IRGC) or redistribution of goods and 
services.  The basiji have benefited from the latter.  They are outsourced to the 
mosques, which benefit from donations from the bazaaris favorably connected to 
the bonyads.  This brings about a system of patronage whereby the regime has 
to funnel money from an ailing economy to provide for the basiji.  The latter have 
to be subsidized because as war veterans, a substantial number of them are 
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unemployable, and even if they were, Iran’s economy is unable to absorb all of 
them. Some basiji get special treatment for university admissions that further 
accentuate the problem because the educated basiji will expect more from a 
regime that is increasingly unable to provide.  At some point, the regime is going 
to see its ability to sponsor the basiji diminished.  At the same time, the country 
will be unable to achieve genocidal means of coercion; hence the mullocracy can 
find itself in danger.104 105*  
E. MAGNITUDE OF VIOLENCE: INTERNAL WAR, TURMOIL, AND 
CONSPIRACY 
 
The coercive balance ends with the estimation of the magnitude of political 
violence.  There are three types of violence: internal war, turmoil, and conspiracy.   
The most severe type of political violence is internal war. Internal wars are 
rare and in essence, they are a full-fledged civil war.  This occurs when the 
regime and dissidents coercive capabilities are approaching equality. In essence, 
this means that the Iranian opposition will have to muster forces as capable as 
the IRGC and basiji. In order for this to occur, the opposition must have solid 
leadership that is capable of keeping its members in line and apply sever 
sanction to discourage apathy or defections.  Since the Iranian opposition lacks 
such a leader, internal war is a very remote probability.106  
In the event the dissidents command substantially less coercive power 
than the regime, an internal war is out of the question because they cannot 
organize themselves.  However, they might take a protracted approach in inciting 
limited violence in the hope they may exert some influence in the mullahs 
policies.  If the defenders of the status quo are strong, the result is only sporadic 
violence.  When the incumbents are unable to exercise coordinated coercion,  
they are bound to fall.  This occurs due to regime weakness.  Iran faces the 
possibility of chronic turmoil because the coercive balance is lopsided.  If the 
regime vacillates, it may suggest to the dissidents that they have equal coercive 
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capability with the regime and therefore, localized riots spread into an all out 
revolution.  A glimpse of this was seen in June 2003.  So far, the mullahs have 
been able to act decisively; however, if they run out of money to pay off the basiji, 
the latter will lack the incentive to fight.107 
A conspiracy occurs if the coercive balance favors the incumbents and the 
dissidents attempt to form clandestine organizations that focus on a perceived 
weakness of the regime.  Conspiracies need very capable and disciplined low 
profile leadership.  A conspiracy also requires a large potential of coercive 
capability as a standby measure.  This could be in the form of possible third party 
intervention such as the 1953 coup against Mossadegh.  Conspiracies normally 
come in the guise of a military coup.  However, the mullahs have practically 
neutralized such an event by having the military stationed as far away as 
practical from Teheran and outsourcing the basiji.108  
Such a move by the mullahs produces an interesting twist. Dissidents in 
Iran are not necessarily based solely in Teheran.  If they were, the dissident 
movement would have greater coercive capability.  With sympathy of some of the 
regimes security apparatus, the opposition may have the upper hand.  By having 
an outsourced basiji, the mullahs have negated Mao Zedong’s “tears in water” 
effect whereby the opposition can blend into the city making a government 
crackdown difficult.  With mosques as an integral part of the community, so long 
as the money flows to the basiji, the regime is secure because it has an 
immediate coercive and over-watch structure on the people.109 
The clerical regime is by no means united but it wields undisputed control 
upon the national instruments of coercion.  The opposition is as disunited now as 
it was in 1979.  The important point of this chapter is to show that even though 
there is disunity within the Iranian dissident movement, the mullahs can still loose 
their hold on power.  The manner in which the opposition operates is important 
because it is preferable that they come to some sort of consensus before the 
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mullahs’ fall.  A repeat of the 1979 situation in which an expedient rally around 
Khomeini enables success is not desirable because the next set of leaders will 
inevitably be led into seeking a messianic figure which may very well set the 
stage for another socio-political quagmire.  Consensus among the opposition will 
allow for a more effective regime change no matter how favorable coercive 
balance might be towards the mullahs.  This is because the latter have to resort 
to patronage rather than legitimacy and any relationship based on gratuities is 
only good so long as the bills are settled.  
FIGURE 4. 
A visual representation of the Coercive Balance Theory (Derived from Why 
Men Rebel p. 340-41, Figures 23-25) 
Incumbents D issidents Incumbents D issidents
Coercive Balance Coercive Balance
Balance is even: Balance in  favor o f incumbents: 
Ideal condition for in ternal war Ideal condition for a  conspiracy
Incumbents D issidents Incumbents D issidents
Coercive Balance Coercive Balance
Balance is lopsided: Balance is lopsided: 
Ideal condition for turmoil Ideal condition for conspiracy
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F. CLOSING ANALYSIS 
 
The theory of Coercive Balance leads to the suggestion that the Iranian 
theocracy may succumb to turmoil because in its present state, the mullahs 
control the preponderance of force although they remain fragmented, and the 
dissidents who are also fragmented feel emboldened by regime vacillation and 
the external pressures from the U.S. led overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 
neighboring Iraq. The occurrence of turmoil leads to the last level of analysis, the 
potential endgame: will the theocracy be overthrown or collapse.  
G. REGIME COLLAPSE 
 
The current state of internal Iranian politics does not favor an overthrow of 
the theocratic regime.  The magnitude of political violence is very unlikely to be a 
conspiracy to which an overthrow of the regime is directly associated because 
conspiracies require a good measure of coercive power which is focused at a key 
entity of the theocracy which appears to be very vulnerable.  This same entity, if 
neutralized needs to be able to render proper governance of the state next to 
impossible.  Therefore, given the fictionalization of the mullahs and the intricate 
web between the ruling clerics, religious establishments, and their dominant 
economic role, there is no single point of vulnerability.  Also mentioned earlier in 
the Coercive Balance section are the three important factions within the 
theocracy: the Line of the Imam, Combatant Clergy Association, and the 
Servants of Construction, one may ask whether a conspiracy can target all three 
successfully?  For all practical purposes, it will be close to impossible for a 
conspiracy to succeed without a single point of vulnerability because conspirators 
must have very capable leadership and maintain a low profile in the planning 
stages.110  Targeting the three institutionalized religious factions is made difficult 
because a wider web of conspirators is necessary.  A wider network of 
conspirators ultimately compromises the plotters security and whatever coercive 
resources they may have will be spread thin because they will have to 
concentrate on three focal points instead of one.  The last concern is that close 
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coordination is necessary and timing would be of the essence.  A conspiracy with 
three focal points cannot be successful if one of the targets are not neutralized 
simultaneously.  As a result, such an action is very risky and does not show 
promise of a reasonable level of success.  This does not mean that there are no 
conspiracies against the theocracy.   
The more likely end the mullahs may meet is their collapse. The theocratic 
apparatus led by the valy-e faqih, Ali Khamanei, could loose effectiveness, suffer 
a reduction in coercive capability, and legitimacy.  The previous chapters have 
indicated how all of the above are presently occurring inside Iran.  Since the 
coercive balance in Iran is overwhelmingly on the side of the mullahs and lacking 
the charismatic leadership of the first valy-e faqih, Khomeini, suffers from an 
erosion of legitimacy, amid increasing discontent, the economic forces of the 
regime are the primary sources of loyalty for the incumbents.  Increasing reliance 
on the basiji and the methods through which patronage is dispensed has made 
co-option the bond between the ruling clerics and the enforcers. A serious 
downturn of the Iranian economy could make aggravate this bond causing an 
erosion of loyalty from the basiji, Revolutionary Guards, and even the military.  
Another factor seldom mentioned is the civil service which helps makes the state 
governable.  If significant numbers of civil servants happen to go uncompensated 
for a prolonged period of time, acute paralysis may overcome Iran.  
When looking at the possibility of clerical collapse in Iran, its western 
neighbor appears to hold some of the cards, which can dictate what may or may 
not happen.  With the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the United States, 
the mullahs’ principal enemy in control of Iraq, Iran appears to be heading for a 
crossroads.  The first dimension is from a political standpoint.  After U.S. 
President George W. Bush labeled Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil” along with 
Iraq and North Korea, the mullahs have seen one of the triad effectively defeated 
in sound fashion and totally occupied within three weeks.  This is not suggesting 
that Iran would meet a similar fate for it has almost three times the population of 
Iraq and over double the land area.  The pawns in this case become the Shi’a 
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majority in Iraq.  The United States is trying to set the stage for a stable Middle 
East beginning with a democratic Iraq that could serve as an example for other 
countries in the region.  From an American point of view, democracy is the best 
way to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq and ensure that its three major 
ethnicities, Shi’a, Sunnis, and Kurds, live together with some semblance of peace 
and have the benefit of the potential wealth that the oil that lies beneath their soil 
can bring.  If the American attempt at democratizing Iran is even close to being 
successful; combined with the rising discontent with the mullahs in Iran, the 
winds of change may very well arrive in Teheran.  This is because the valy-e 
faqih system as mentioned has its legitimacy based on the fact that the holder of 
the position will rule Iran in the name of the Twelfth Imam.  It so happens that the 
two holiest Shi’a shrines are not in Iran, but in neighboring Iraq.  If the people 
who control the two holiest Shi’a shrines are capable of coexisting within some 
democratic framework, Iranian dissidents will wonder why the Iranian clerics who 
control the lesser shrines like Qom cannot live up to the same principle.  The 
mullahs will see their legitimacy undermined further.  In their bid to forestall 
democracy in Iraq, the mullahs hosted Ayatollah Hakim, leader of the Supreme 
Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) during his long exile.  The mullahs 
have guarded optimism that Iraq would be transformed into another religious 
state.   
Although the mullahs want Iraq to become a theocracy, the possibility of 
this happening in Iraq is not high because the United States has made it clear 
that it would oppose such a move.  A good democratic framework cannot exist 
with a tyranny of the majority, and the Shi’a population in Iraq is only 65 percent 
against 90 percent in Iran. A theocracy in Iraq would only be of short-term 
usefulness to Teheran because there is a possibility that the struggle to assert 
legitimacy on the part of a possible Iraqi theocracy might be undermined by the 
mullahs in Iran.  Iranian clerics would see an Iraqi theocracy as a means to exert 
greater control over the shrines in Najaf and Kerbala in an attempt to retain their 
legitimacy at home.  The Iraqis would react to increasing foreign intervention, as 
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they would like to be masters of their own destiny. This will lead to a bitter 
polarization of the Shi’a sect and probable warfare between Iraqis and Iranians.  
This will induce heavy strain on Iran’s already weak economy, although it could 
help rally enormous support behind the mullahs.   
A more likely scenario is the return of economic viability in Iraq.  Iran’s 
neighbor has the world’s second largest petroleum reserves.  After over two 
decades of deprivation due to war and sanctions, Iraq, once its oil infrastructure 
is reconstituted, will tap the resources for its benefit.  This will lead to a situation 
in which an oil producer with immense reserves returns to the global from which 
it has been inadequately represented for over a dozen years. Iraq’s entry into the 
oil market in full force will lead to a drastic fall in oil prices because the United 
States helped guarantee the availability of its resources.  This will mean 
diminished revenues for Iran as well as all of the other countries in the Gulf 
region. Therefore, the mullahs will face only rising discontent and diminished 
ability to co-opt the coercive powers at their disposal.  Given the mullahs inability 
to provide, there will be little incentive to remain loyal to the latter.  
The situation in Iraq will be done more justice if studied by another 
observer.  It is only mentioned because in the introductory chapter, there was 
mention of three significant pressure points on the Iranian regime: economic dire 
straits, the Global War on Terrorism, and the lack of social freedom suffered by 
the general populace.  The results of the U.S. led occupation in Iraq therefore 
serve as a catalyst that can only serve to increase the magnitude of the pressure 
points for the reasons mentioned above.  The fact of the matter is that the 
mullahs’ survival has gradually shifted from a largely theocratic basis since the 
death of Khomeini to one based on patronage to mainly the bonyads and basiji.  
Therefore no matter which way things go in Iraq, a severe impact will be felt on 
the mullahs’ coffers because it has been exhaustively mentioned that 80 percent 
of the country’s revenues come from petroleum. Since the clerics have effected 
little progress in the country since 1979, further aggravation of the Iranian 
economy will bring about a level of discontent they themselves cannot handle 
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because their principal means of coming to terms with challenges is by directing 
money to their stalwarts to suppress the problem.  Since Iran is nowhere near 
subsistence level like Iraq used to be during the period of United Nations 
sanctions and Saddam Hussein, a point of diminishing returns will arrive for 
regime supporters.  The June 2003 riots are starting to awaken the world to the 
dwindling lot of the mullahs because once again they had to rely on basiji 
motorcycle gangs to suppress the student protests. The students are far from 
isolated from the world because of the Internet and satellite television.  These 
media show the students what they are missing out on while the theocracy 
continues.  Clerics like Montazeri, witnessing the damage the theocracy is doing 
to the faith and as such try to distance themselves from the mainline 
establishment. 
And although we would like to see a peaceful regime change in Iran, it is 
all the more unlikely because if sovereignty is transferred to the people 
peacefully, the mullahs will no doubt be credited for such foresight leaving them 
in a position to exert the same influence which they young Iranians, the majority 
of the population seek to avoid.   
This work is not an attempt to predict when the change in Iran will occur 
for history has been most unkind to those who have tired to predict the course of 
Iranian history. It is merely a collection of some of Theodore Gurr’s theories of 
social revolution combined with a follow up on the previous work of Dariush 
Zahedi in order to identify conditions, which will lead to the end of the Iranian 
theocracy.  Given the facts and interpretations from this work, it is apparent that 










Abbas Abdi. “The Reform Movement: Background and Vulnerability” Global 
Dialogue, Summer 2001. 
 
S. A. Arjomand. “Iran’s Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective.” World 
Politics.  April 1988   
 
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre. Iran shuts Internet cafés. 
http://www.apnic.net/mailing-lists/apple/archive/2001/05/msg00012.html (26 June 
2003) 
 
BBC News. “Hope on the streets of Teheran.” 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2996604.stm (26 June 2003) 
 
BBC News. ”Iran’s Parliament Backs Reformist Bill and Iran’s Khatami wants 
more powers. ” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2436427.stm  and 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2278345.stm (11 December 2002) 
 




BBC News Q&A. “Iran’s Political Tensions.”  , 26 November 2002. Accessed on 
16 March 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2515933.stm 
 
Club de Paris. Paris Club. Presentation. 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/presentation/presentation.php?BATCH=B01WP01 
(9 March 2003) 
 
CNN Interactive. Transcript of interview with Iranian President Mohammed 
Khatami. http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html (11 December 
2002)  
 
Kianouche Dorranie. Suspect in Iranian dissident murders commits suicide. 
Accessed 18 March 2003. http://www.metimes.com/issue99-
26/reg/suspect_in_iranian.htm 
 
Michael Eisenstadt. “The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran”: An 




Sam Ghandichi. What is Wrong with the Iranian Opposition?  (18 March 2003). 
http://www.ghandichi.com/158-individuals.htm 
 





Arthur Goldschmidt. Jr. A Concise History of the Middle East. Boulder. 
Westview Press, 1996.  
 
Jack Goldstone, Ted Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri: Revolutions of the Late 
Twentieth Century. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. 
 
Iran, Iranian History, Land and People. Fossil Fuel. 
http://www.sanibrite.ca/iran/oil.asp (9 March 2003) 
 
Iran World News and Events. Economy. 
http://www.iranworld.com/news&events/nec-m999.asp. (9 March 2003). 
 
Rahe Kargar. Sinking in the Jaws of a General Crisis, Political report of the 5th 
Congress of the Organization of Revolutionary Workers of Iran. http://www.iran-
bulletin.org/report_5th_congress.html (10 December 2002)  
 
Suzanne Maloney: “A report on “Bonyads: Power in Iran.”  Middle East Institute 
Policy Briefs. http://www.mideasti.org/html/maloneyb.html (7 December 2002) 
 
Ardeshir Mehrdad. “Leadership; Crisis yesterday, deadlock tomorrow.” Iran-
Bulletin.org. Http: //www.iran-bulletin.org/leadership_crisis_RK41.htm. (10 
December 2002). 
 
Bijan Mosavar-Rahmani. Oil in U.S.-Iranian Relations. 
http://www.worlddialogue.org/pdf/speech8.pdf (9 March 2003) 
 
Mehdi Moslem. Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran. p 38. Syracuse 
University Press, Syracuse, 2002. 
 
George Peteé. The Process of Revolution. New York, Harper, 1938. 
 
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). “Terror and Teheran: The structure of 
power in Iran.” Frontline.  




Michael J. Ring. Changing the U.S. Policy Tune - The United States Should 
Respond Positively to Khatami's Overtures. http://www-
tech.mit.edu/V117/N66/ring.66c.html (14 December 2002) 
 
Dr Kalim Siddiqui. Imam Khomeini in history, by History, for History. 
http://www.muslimedia.com/archives/features98/khomeini.htm (8 March 2003) 
  
William Samii. “Factionalism in Iran's Domestic Security Forces.” Middle East 
Intelligence Bulletin. 16 March 2003.  http://www.meib.org/articles/0202_me2.htm 
 
The World Bank Group. Islamic Republic of Iran Country Brief. 
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Countries/Iran/716EBCBF845AD3F
785256B740073AB54?OpenDocument (8 December 2002) 
 
U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs. 
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01080303.htm (9 March 2003) 
 
U.S. Energy Information Agency. Iran Country Analysis Brief. 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.html (14 December 2002)  
 
U.S. Library of Congress. “Iranian Armed Forces.” IRAN - A Country Study. 16 
March 2003. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/irtoc.html 
 
Stephen Walt. “Revolution and War”, World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992), 
reprinted in J. Goldstone, ed., Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and 
Historical Studies. Little Brown, 1993. 
 
Ebrahim Yazdi.  Speech on evolution of Iranian society (Middle East Institute, 
Washington D.C., 1998). http://www.payk.net/mailingLists/iran-
news/html/1999/msg00427.html (10 March 2003) 
 
Dariush Zahedi. The Iranian Revolution Then and Now, indicators of regime 
instability. Boulder, Westview Press, 2001 
 
Sanabargh Zahedi. “The Three Factions of the Clerical Regime.” National 
Council of Resistance of Iran Foreign Affairs Committee: The Myth of 








































INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Professor Ahmad G. Ghoreishi 
Department of National Security Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California 
 
4. Professor James A. Russell 
Department of National Security Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School  
 Monterey, California 
 65
